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Notes
NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL BOARDS ASS'N V SOBOL:
A COMMENDABLE ATTEMPT TO APPLY
CONFUSING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
STANDARDS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States was founded on one overriding principle-freedom. In the 1700s, Colonial America revolted against
the power and control of Great Britain's royal government in an
effort to obtain personal and political freedom.I Ultimately, the
success of the American Revolution afforded our Founding Fathers the opportunity to provide these cherished freedoms to an
aspiring young nation.2 Among other desires, Americans sought
to secure their right to religious freedom via the separation of
Church-State relations. 3 In 1789, the First Congress responded
to these demands by drafting twelve proposed amendments to
the Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. 4 Ratified in 1791,
the Bill of Rights proclaimed America's right to religious freedom
in the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . .."5
The opening clause of the First Amendment has become
1. CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT:
FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 1-

4 (1964) (providing brief historical review of early America's struggle for freedom). See generally THOMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE
IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-192 (1986) (recounting

development of relationship between church and state in America).
2. See ANTIEAU, Supra note 1, at 30-31 (discussing religious liberty and dises-

tablishment in early America).
3. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 795 (1973) ("[T]he separation of Church from State ... [has] been regarded from the beginning as among the most cherished features of our constitutional system."); see also ANTIEAU, supra note 1,at 30-31.
4. See CURRY, supra note 1,at 193-222 (discussing Bill of Rights as proposed
amendments to Constitution); see also ROBERT L. MADDOX, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE: GUARANTOR OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 58-68 (1987) (discuss-

ing debates over religious liberty during framing of Constitution).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is actually a dual declaration of religious freedoms: (1) the Establishment Clause, and (2) the Free Exer-

cise Clause. See CURRY, supra note 1, at 193. The Establishment Clause states
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S.

(759)
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known as the "Establishment Clause." 6 Although the Establishment Clause appears facially precise and unambiguous, courts
have struggled for half a century to apply this constitutional manCONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause states that "Congress shall make no
law ... prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
6. See CURRY, supra note 1, at 193. Although the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause are intimately interrelated, a discussion of the Free
Exercise Clause is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the relationship between the two religion clauses, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2 (2d ed. 1988) ("Allocating religious choices to the
unfettered consciences of individuals under the free exercise clause remains, in
part, a means of assuring that church and state do not unite to create the many
dangers and divisions often implicit in such an established union."); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other."). For a discussion of the Free Exercise Clause, see TRIBE, supra,
§ § 14-12 to - 13. See generally Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 249-277 (1989) (providing
detailed discussion of historical and scholarly definitions of "religion" under the
religion clauses); Nadine Strossen,Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses, 11 PACE
L. REV. 491, 496-501 (1991) (analyzing Supreme Court interpretations of Free
Exercise Clause); David de Andrade, Note, The Equal Access Act: The Establishment
Clause v. The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 45659 (1988) (discussing distinction between religion clauses).
In 1789, the Senate and the House drafted and revised a number of proposals for the religion clauses. The Senate proposed: "Congress shall make no law
establishing any particular denomination of religion in preference to another."
MADDOX, supra note 4, at 63. The House, however, preferred the following:
"Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." NORMAN DE JONG & JOHN
VAN DER SLIK, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: THE MYTH REVISITED 138
(1985) (discussing development of First Amendment). The Senate redrafted the
latter proposal by the House to read: "Congress shall make no law establishing
articles of faith, or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and petition to the government for the redress of grievances." Id. at 139.
For a discussion of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in general, and the
First Amendment in particular, see ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: 1776-1791 126-58 (1955) (detailing ratification struggle); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BILL
OF RIGHTS 160-91 (1977) (providing description of Bill of Rights from concep-

tion to ratification).
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date consistently. 7 New York State School Boards Ass'n v. Sobol 8 is no
exception. In Sobol, the New York State Commissioner of Education promulgated regulations mandating Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) instruction to all elementary and
secondary schoolchildren. 9 In an effort to formulate an AIDS instruction plan that would appeal to a broad range of individuals,
the regulations required New York public school boards to establish advisory councils that would incorporate community recommendations. 1 0 To foster diverse and representative input, the
Commissioner also adopted a regulation that expressly defined
7. Donald E. Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First Amendment,
50 OHIo ST. L.J. 681, 681 (1989). The author states that:
Supreme Court review, pursuant to the first amendment's establishment clause, may not reflect the original miscalculations characterizing
other constitutional ignominies such as, slavery, segregation, and
Lochnerism. Still, the construction and execution of standards fail to
satisfy even minimal expectations of persuasive and credible analysis.
They are dishonored in word, by critics who regard their inconsistencies as an embarrassment, and in deed, by exponents who apply them
erratically or simply dispense with them when convenience beckons.
Id. (citations omitted).
For an analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, see infra notes 24-119 and accompanying text. Another author noted
the Supreme Court's struggle for consistent results: " 'When everything matters, when nothing is dispositive, when we must juggle incommensurable factors, a judge can do little but announce his gestalt.' Hence a judge or justice can
buttress his [or her] opinion with precedent which most clearly reflects his or her
beliefs." Timothy V. Franklin, Comment, Squeezing theJuice Out of the Lemon Test,
72 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (1972) (citation omitted); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("The language of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment is at best opaque .... ").
8. 591 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (N.Y. 1992) (holding New York State Education
Department regulation did not violate First Amendment despite expressly mandating inclusion of representatives from religious organizations on advisory
council), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 305 (1992).
9. Id. at 1147. The State Commissioner of Education acted pursuant to the
following New York law:
The commissioner may prescribe in regulations such health education
courses which include instruction regarding alcohol, tobacco, and other
drugs as the commissioner may deem necessary and desirable for the
welfare of pupils and the community. The contents may be varied to
meet the needs of particular school districts, or portions thereof, and
need not be uniform throughout the state, provided however, that
school districts shall utilize either the curriculum for health education
instruction regarding alcohol, tobacco and other drugs prescribed by
the commissioner or a course approved by the commissioner in accordance with criteria established by the commissioner.
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 804(4) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
10. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1147 (describing New York's procedure for formulating and implementing content of education in public schools). Under the
Commissioner's regulation, the advisory councils were responsible for making
"recommendations regarding the content, implementation and evaluation of the
instruction" in public schools. Id.
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several categories of community individuals who would occupy
the council positions."I One of the categories specified was "rep12
resentatives from religious organizations."
The New York State School Boards Association (Association)
challenged the constitutional validity of the regulation on two
grounds.' 3 First, the Association argued that the regulation represented a symbolic, link between church and state.14 Second, the
Association feared that the regulation promoted an excessive entanglement of church and state. 15 In short, the Association contended that the regulation violated the Establishment Clause
6
because it was a "law respecting an establishment of religion."'
The Sobol court rejected the Association's arguments as speculative. 17 Ultimately, the court applied the tripartite test espoused
by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman 18 and
concluded that the regulation did not violate the First
Amendment. l9
This Note will analyze the New York Court of Appeals' hold11. Id.
12. Id. The regulation stated that: "The advisory council shall consist of
parents, school board members, appropriate school personnel, and community
representatives, including representativesfrom religious organizations." Id. (quoting
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 8, § 135.3[b][2] & [c][2]).
13. Id. at 1147-48. The Court of Appeals of New York stressed that the
Association's claim was based on "facial unconstitutionality," and not on an " 'as
applied' unconstitutionality argument," explaining that sufficient evidence of
the result of implementing the regulation was lacking. Id. For a discussion of
the Association's claim based on facial unconstitutionality, see infra note 126.
14. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1148.
15. Id.; see, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (holding government enactment violates Establishment Clause if it creates excessive entanglement of church and state).
16. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1147; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a discussion of the First Amendment, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
17. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150-52 (rejecting Association's arguments and
holding regulation permitting religious representatives to occupy positions on
public school advisory council constitutional under Establishment Clause).
18. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (delineating three criteria extracted from
Supreme Court precedent that courts consider when dealing with Establishment
Clause). For a detailed discussion of the Lemon v. Kurtzman tripartite test, see
infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. Lemon has become the accepted standard for determining the constitutionality of government activity that may compromise the separation between church and state. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (applying Lemon criteria to determine constitutionality
under Establishment Clause); cf Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992)
(applying coercion analysis to facts of case but declining to overrule Lemon test
for determining Establishment Clause violation). The Lemon test, however, has
not clarified the law surrounding the Establishment Clause. See Lively, supra
note 7, at 681 ("The elements of [the Lemon] tripartite formula have bred dissonance and betrayed analytical weakness.").
19. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152.
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ing in New York State School Boards Ass 'n v. Sobol.20 The Note begins
with a background discussion of Establishment Clause precedent
and the concept of "accommodation"-the two driving factors
behind the Sobol decision. 2 ' The Note then compares the reasoning of the Sobol majority with the contradictory analysis of the dissentingjudges. 2 2 Finally, this Note submits that the Sobol decision
is entirely consistent with Establishment Clause precedent and
23
serves to reinforce judicial reliance on "accommodation.II.

A.

THE HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSEEVERSON TO WEISMAN

Foundations in Establishment Clause Litigation and the
"Accommodation" v. "Strict Separation" Dichotomy

Much of the controversy surrounding the interpretation of
the Establishment Clause has resulted from intense debate over
the true intent of our Founding Fathers. 24 The Supreme Court
20. Id. at 1147-52 (holding regulation constitutional even though it provided for religious representatives on public advisory council).
21. For a discussion of the development of the Establishment Clause, see
infra notes 24-110 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "accomodationist" perspective in respect to the Establishment Clause, see infra notes 24119, 174-82 and accompanying text.
22. For an analysis of the majority's rationale for finding the Sobol regulation constitutional, see infra notes 134-56 and accompanying text. For a comparison of the majority's reasoning with the minority rationale, see infra notes
157-73 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the validity of Sobol under Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 174-208 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Sobol's
application of the "accommodationist" perspective, see infra notes 174-82 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Sobol's impact and significance, see infra
notes 209-17 and accompanying text.
24. A thorough discussion of the actual intent of our Founding Fathers is
beyond the scope of this Note. At the same time, however, a note that failed to
recognize the controversy over actual intent would confront the Establishment
Clause issue without any sense of its origin. For a discussion of the meaning
behind "an establishment of religion," see generally ANTIEAU, supra note 1. See
also MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AuTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 13-17 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds.,
1978) (advocating nonpreferentialist interpretation of Establishment Clause
placing great emphasis on Congress' use of "an establishment" over other available terms). But cf. LEONARD W. LEVy, The Establishment Clause, in How DOES THE
CONSTITUTION PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? 69, 69-90 (1987) (advocating
more absolute separation between church and state in accordance with views of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison).
A discussion of original intent would be incomplete without mention of
Thomas Jefferson's famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut that set forth his "separationist" view on the relationship of church and
state. The letter read:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
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reflected these differing views in Everson v. Board of Education.2 5
Decided in 1947, Everson unofficially marked the beginning of
modern Establishment Clause litigation and an era wrought with
confusion and uncertainty.2 6 In Everson, Justice Black expressly
relied on Thomas Jefferson's theory of strict separation between
worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only,
and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of
the whole American people which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church
and State.

Reply to The Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Replies to Public Addresses, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (H.A.
Washington ed., 1854) (emphasis added).
For a more in-depth analysis of the accommodationist and absolute separationist views of original intent, see Robert L. Cord, Founding Intentions and the
Establishment Clause: Harmonizing Accommodation and Separation, 10 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 47, 51 & nn. 19-20 (1987) (concluding original Framers of Establishment Clause sought only to prevent government from imposing one national
religion and to prevent government from placing any religion in preferred position); see also John E. Dunsford, The Relevance of OriginalIntention in Thinking About
Establishment Clause Problems, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 197, 197-202 (1987)
(supporting accommodationist interpretation of Establishment Clause); William
P. Marshall, Unprecedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
925, 925-31 (1986) (stating that analyzing original intent will not clear ambiguities in Establishment Clause); Mark Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation, 33 Loy. L. REV. 221, 225 (1987) (discussing problems with
originalism as constitutional theory); Laura Zwicker, Note, The Politics of Toleration: The Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773,
792-799 (arguing intention of Founding Fathers was "toleration" not "separation" which Court has subscribed to since Everson v. Board of Education). But cf.
Steve Gey, Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation
of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1473-77 (1981) (advocating
strict neutrality/absolute separation of church and state as established in
Everson).
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. Id. at 8-15. Justice Black used the Everson decision to recount the development of the Establishment Clause. Id. From this history, he concluded that
the Establishment Clause should be applied and interpreted broadly because:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and State."
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
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church and state to uphold the statute at issue.2 7 However, the
Everson Court implicitly adopted a doctrinal perspective wholly inconsistent with strict separation: "accommodation." 2 8 Whereas
strict separation disallows any interaction between church and
state, the "accommodationist" approach evinces a degree of judicial tolerance for statutes despite the incidental benefits or burdens they may confer on religion. 29 Judicial reliance on
"accommodation" will safeguard laws that confer incidental benefits on religious groups, provided that those laws advance a valid
secular purpose and result in a secular effect.
Everson involved a New Jersey statute that authorized local
school districts to reimburse parents for the costs of sending their
children to school via the public transportation system. 3 0 The Establishment Clause was implicated when one New Jersey school
district extended reimbursement benefits to parents of children
Compare Justice Black's interpretation to James Antieau's summary of the
historical objectives of the Establishment Clause:
1. An equal opportunity to hold public office and exercise political
rights, regardless of religious beliefs;
2. An end to taxes for the support of a particular religious faith to
which the taxpayer did not subscribe;
3. Termination of laws requiring dissenters to attend services of the
dominant faith;
4. Equal economic opportunities for dissenters and an end to advantages and preferences possessed by the members of the dominant faith;
5. An end not only to "exclusive establishments," such as Anglican or
Congregationalist, but also to "multiple establishments," such as Protestantism; and
6. Toleration and equal opportunity to practice a faith, so long as it
did not jeopardize the equal rights of others or imperil the common
good.
See ANTIEAU, supra note 1, at 31. Thus, Antieau appears willing to accept a certain degree of interplay between church and state (accommodation), whereas
Justice Black appears unwilling to stray from Thomas Jefferson's notion of strict
separation.
27. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-15, 18. For a discussion of Thomas Jefferson's
strict separationist perspective, see supra note 24.
28. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. Although the Everson Court did not expressly
purport to "accommodate" religion, its decision cannot be justified by any other
line of reasoning. Id.; see also John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 83, 107-08 (1986) (stating Everson decision rested on "child benefit theory" which is equivalent to basing decision on
valid general welfare purpose grounds). For a detailed discussion of the
Supreme Court's implicit and explicit reliance on "accommodation," see infra
notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of "accommodation," see Erwin N. Griswold, Absolute
Is In the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to ConstitutionalQuestions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167, 169-73 (1963) (suggesting Establishment Clause does
not mandate strict, absolute separation of church and state).
30. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3-5 (discussing New Jersey statute and its Establishment Clause ramifications).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 4

766

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 759

attending Catholic parochial schools. 3 ' Although the Supreme
Court claimed to support Thomas Jefferson's theory that advocated an impenetrable wall between church and state, it upheld
the constitutionality of New Jersey's statute.3 2 The Court held
that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause because
its purpose and effect was to advance the general welfare of soci33
ety, not the welfare of purely sectarian establishments.
The Court determined that New Jersey was able to maintain
its position of religious neutrality by accommodating, or allowing,
34
reimbursement benefits to parents of parochial schoolchildren.
The doctrine of "strict separation" would not permit such a result.3 5 By definition, strict separation entails an absolute segrega31. Id. at 3-4. The First Amendment Establishment Clause was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
32. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. The Court stated that "[tihe First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not
breached it here." Id. Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion, however, epitomizes the Court's struggle to interpret the Establishment Clause consistently.
Id. at 44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Although Rutledge agreed with the majority's basic premise-that the Establishment Clause requires complete and permanent separation-he reached the opposite conclusion:
[Alpart from efforts to inject religious training or exercises and sectarian issues into the public schools, the only serious surviving threat to
maintaining that complete and permanent separation of religion and
civil power which the First Amendment commands is through use of
the taxing power to support religion, religious establishments, or establishments having a religious foundation whatever their form or special
religious function.
Id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (supporting true strict separation).
33. Id. at 16. The Court held that the statute did not support or contribute
to an establishment of religion. Id. at 18. The statute was a general law that
benefitted all New Jersey citizens regardless of religious affiliation. Id. According to the Everson Court: "[This] legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their
religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Id. (emphasis
added).
34. Id. at 17-18. See Ellis M. West, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty in
the Public Schools, 25J. CHURCH & ST. 87, 97 (1983) (stating Supreme Court has
consistently relied on principle of accommodation or "benevolent neutrality"
since Everson v. Board of Education); see also Cord, supra note 24, at 51 ("For [the
framers of the First Amendment] separation of Church and State precluded state
religious partisanship, not state religious accommodation or, in some instances,
even state collaboration."). For an in depth discussion of the concept of neutrality, see Valauri, supra note 28, at 89-94 (1986).
35. See generally Leo Pfeffer, The Establishment Clause: An Absolutist s Defense, 4
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICs AND PUB. POL'Y 699, 699-729 (1990) (defending and
advocating doctrine of strict separation).
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tion of religious and state affairs. 3 6 If the Everson Court had
adopted a strict separationist approach, the New Jersey statute
would have breached this duty of total segregation and violated
the Establishment Clause. Evincing its accommodationist perspective, however, the Court focused on the purpose and effect of
37
the law to hold it sufficiently neutral.
More than a decade later, the Court relied on Everson to reach
a consistent result in McGowan v. Maryland.3 8 The McGowan Court
held Maryland's Sunday Blue Laws constitutional under the Establishment Clause. 39 As in Everson, the Court based its holding
on the purpose and effect of the Blue Laws: "to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens." 40 Maryland's Sunday Blue Laws
did not violate the Establishment Clause because they promoted
the welfare of society as a whole, rather than the sectarian interests of a few. 4 ' By upholding these laws despite their historically
religious rationale, the Court comported with the explicit reasoning of the Everson Court as well as its implicit reliance on
42
accommodation.
176.

36. For a more comprehensive discussion of strict separation, see infra note

37. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
38. 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961) (holding Sunday Blue Laws proscribing labor
and general commercial activity did not violate Establishment Clause).
39. Id. at 453 (restricting holding to specific statutory section in question).
In McGowan, the defendants were indicted for violating Maryland's Sunday Blue
Laws. Id. at 422. The defendants violated the Blue Laws when they sold a looseleaf binder, a can of floor wax, a stapler, staples, and a toy submarine on Sunday.
Id. For a description of the specific prohibitions under the Maryland Blue Laws
(MD. ANN. CODE ART. 27, § 521 (1957)), see id. at 422-23.

40. Id. at 445. The Court recognized that Sunday Blue Laws were originally established solely to facilitate and encourage religion. Id. at 431. However, society eventually adopted Sunday as a universal, secular day of rest. Id. at
445. Thus, the original purpose and foundation of the Blue Laws were no
longer relevant. Id. The Court stated that "[Sunday Blue Laws presently] bear
no relationship to establishment of religion as those words are used in the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 444. For a discussion of the analogous
facts of Everson, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
41. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 443-45. According to the Court, "[t]he present
purpose and effect of [Sunday Blue Laws] is to provide a uniform day of rest for
all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the
dominant Christian sects, does not bar the State from achieving its secular
goals." Id. at 445.
The Court's rationale in McGowan is consistent with its rationale in Everson.
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. For a discussion of the "purpose and effect" language in Everson, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442. The Court stated: "[T]he Establishment
Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions." Id. With this perspective, the Court appears to recognize that there
is a degree of inevitable interplay between church and state and that incidental
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed its dedication to the Establishment Clause, and to the separation of church and state, in Engel v. Vitale.4 3 In Engel, a New York school district adopted a
regulation that established daily prayer in public schools. 4 4 The
regulation required students to read the following prayer aloud at
the beginning of each school day: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon

us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." 45 The Court
found the mandatory school prayer regulation unconstitutional
because it patently contravened the freedoms guaranteed by the
Establishment Clause. 46 The sole, impermissible purpose of the
regulation was to promote religious interests. 4 7 Thus, in striking
down the regulation because of its impermissible purpose, the
Court's focus on "secular purpose" was analytically consistent
with Everson and McGowan. 48
benefits conferred on religious groups must occasionally be accommodated to
further secular concerns. Id.; see Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.

43. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. Id. at 422. The school district adopted the daily prayer on the recommendation of New York's State Board of Regents. Id. According to the Board
of Regents, the prayer was part of their "Statement on Moral and Spiritual
Training in the schools." Id. at 423.
45. Id. at 422. The mandatory school prayer in Engel is probably the clearest Establishment Clause violation the Supreme Court has seen in the twentieth
century. Id. at 425. A law that requires prayer in public schools is a law respecting an establishment of religion. Id. at 422-25. According to the Engel Court:
[T]he constitutional prohibition against an establishment of religion
must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government.
Id. at 425; cf. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (stating minimum rights afforded by
Establishment Clause). The Supreme Court later clarified that government enactments must have a secular purpose. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963) (clarifying two Establishment Clause requirements). For a discussion of Schempp, see infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
46. Engel, 370 U.S. at 424. The respondents asserted that the Court's holding demonstrated government hostility toward religion. Id. at 433-34. The
Court adamantly rejected this argument: "It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of
the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look
to for religious guidance." Id. at 435.
47. Id. at 424-25 ("The nature of such a prayer has always been religious
.")(emphasis added). The notion of accommodation is not an issue in cases
such as Engel. Where the Court decides that the sole purpose of a law is unequivocally sectarian, there can be no secular advantage in accommodating its
effects or goals. Id. at 425. As the Court stated: "[I]t is no part of the business
of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id.
48. Id. For a discussion of the reasoning in Everson, see supra notes 25-37
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The Court extracted and divided the Everson "purpose and
effect" test into two distinct yet interrelated standards in School
District v. Schempp. 49 The Schempp Court therefore established two
criteria for determining a statute's constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. 50 First, all legislative enactments must have a
secular purpose that does not advance or inhibit religion, according to the Court.5 ' Second, the Court required that the primary
effect of that act must neither advance nor inhibit religion. 52 The
Schempp Court interpreted these two criteria as requiring governmental authority to retain a position of religious neutrality. 53 The
School District of Abington violated this duty of neutrality when it
required daily bible readings and recitation of the Lord's prayer
in its public schools. 54 The Court concluded that a government
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the reasoning in McGowan, see supra
notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
49. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (holding mandatory public school bible reading statute unconstitutional because it violated state's duty of neutrality under
Establishment Clause).
50. Id. at 222. Schempp dealt with a Pennsylvania statute that provided: "At
least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day." Id. at 205 (quoting 24 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 15-1516 (Supp. 1960)). The Abington School District also required its students to recite the Lord's Prayer in unison. Id. at 207.
The Court was careful to emphasize that religion may certainly be taught in
public schools. Id. at 225. The study of religion, however, must be through
objective instruction and it must be part of an overall secular curriculum. Id.
51. Id. at 222. The Schempp Court's secular purpose prong was not a radical
departure from precedent. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)
(holding reimbursement regulation constitutional because "[the] legislation, as
applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their
children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961) (holding
Sunday Blue Laws constitutional because their "purpose and effect . . . is to
provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens"); Engel, 370 U.S. at 424-25 (holding regulation unconstitutional because mandating school prayer is not valid
secular purpose).
52. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. Similar to the secular purpose requirement,
the "primary effect" test utilized by the Schempp Court is not new to Establishment Clause analysis. For a list of prior holdings that utilized the "primary effect" test in relation to the secular purpose test, see supra note 51.
53. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
54, Id. at 223. The Court found that the bible readings and prayer requirement had an impermissible religious character that violated the Establishment
Clause. Id. Abington School District claimed that the Court, in effect, promoted
a "religion of secularism" by not allowing school prayer. Id. at 225. This argument was, however, flawed: "We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade th[e] citadel [of
religion], whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard." Id. at 226. In Schempp, as in Engel, the distinctly religious purpose of the
statute precluded the judicial approach of accommodation. For a discussion of
why the Engel Court did not utilize the more lenient accommodationist perspective, see spra note 47.
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authority cannot maintain religious neutrality while simultane55
ously prescribing school prayer.
• In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court applied the Schempp secular purpose test and, finding that analysis incomplete, created and
applied its own "excessive entanglement" test. 5 6 The issue in
Walz concerned the constitutional validity of a New York City tax
exemption that excluded from taxation all property used exclusively for religious purposes. 5 7 The Court held that although the
exemption advanced religious interests, it did not violate the Establishment Clause. 58 The Court applied the Schempp Court's secular purpose test and concluded that the exemption was
permissible because it eased the financial burdens placed on religious institutions to indirectly advance the "mental improvement" of individuals-in this case, religious adherents. 59
Under then existing precedent, the Walz Court could have
concluded its analysis on a "secular purpose" note. However, the
Court went one step further and created and applied its own "excessive entanglement" test. 60 This excessive entanglement test
55. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223-24.
56. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
57. Id. at 666-67. The New York Constitution authorized that:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real or
personal property used exclusively for religious, educational or charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one or more of such
purposes and not operating for profit.
Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1). But see id. at 700-01 (Douglas J., dissenting) (arguing statute is unconstitutional because it unjustly favors religious proponents over atheists or agnostics merely because latter are non-believers).
58. Id. at 680. The Court held the tax exemption constitutional because it
had a secular purpose, it did not advance or inhibit religion and it did not promote hostility toward religion. Id. at 672-73, 675. But cf id. at 701 (Douglas J.,
dissenting) ("Indeed I would suppose that in common understanding one of the
best ways to 'establish' one or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax
exemption does."). Commentators, like many of the Justices themselves,
strongly disagree with the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause holdings:
How, for example, can a law which exempts churches from taxes that
others must pay be justified as without the purpose or effect of advancing religious interests and without avoiding entanglement? Yet, that
was the Court's conclusion in JWalz v. Tax Commission. A more tortured
opinion would be hard to find.
Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 18 (1979) (citations omitted).
59. I'alz, 397 U.S. at 672-73. By easing the financial burden associated
with property ownership (i.e. taxation), New York City was indirectly promoting
the "moral or mental improvement" that religion fosters in its citizens-undeniably a secular concern. Id. at 672.
60. Id. at 674. The Walz Court derived its analysis from its interpretation of
the term "an establishment of religion." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Court
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was, in actuality, only an extension of the Schempp Court's primary
effect analysis. 6 ' The Court stated that the ultimate effect of any
government activity must not excessively entangle the affairs of
church and state. 62 The Court recognized that the tax exemption
essentially established a public subsidy for religion, but concluded that its ultimate effect did not excessively entangle the affairs of church and state to an impermissible degree. 6 3
Thus, the Walz decision reiterated the Supreme Court's accommodationist perspective: a government enactment may confer a benefit on religious institutions without violating the
Establishment Clause. 6 4 The Walz Court expressly recognized
the need for, and the practical benefits that flow from, accommodating a certain degree of interaction between church and state. 65
reasoned that: "[T]he 'establishment' of a religion connote[s] sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668. The "secular purpose" and "excessive entanglement"
tests logically arise from this interpretation and have been reiterated in application numerous times. Id. at 672, 674. The Court's interpretation of "an establishment of religion"-particularly that the term connotes "active involvement
of the sovereign"- precluded it from relying solely on the secular purpose requirement. Id. at 672. Thus, a law that satisfies the secular purpose test will still
fail if it results in an excessive entanglement of church and state. Id. at 674.
61. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (extending Schempp primary effect analysis by measuring degree of entanglement based on enactment's end result or effect).
62. Id. (stating "[excessive entanglement] test is inescapably one of
degree").
63. Id. at 675. Interpreted literally, Walz validates government activity that
incidentally effects-beneficially or detrimentally-an establishment of religion
as long as it does not excessively entangle church and state. Id. at 674. This
concept has become known as "Accommodation." See David Felsen, Comment,
Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistenc, for the Future,
38 AM. UNIV. L. REv. 395, 405-06 (1989) (stating doctrinal viewpoint of"accommodation" creates protective zone for limited degree of interaction between
church and state). The doctrinal viewpoint known as "Pluralism" can also be
devised from the Walz decision. Id. at 410. "Pluralism" provides for equal treatment of all religions. Id. The religion based tax exemption in Italz applied to all
religious institutions and thus promoted religious pluralism. See l'alz, 397 U.S.
at 673.
64. Despite the Walz Court's willingness to accommodate church-state interaction, its interpretation of the Establishment Clause is still consistent with
the Everson Court's call for a "high and impregnable" wall between church and
state because the Court was careful to qualify its apparent "separationist" position. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Everson qualified its
adherence to Thomas Jefferson's position of strict separation by recognizing
that not every law conferring a benefit on religious institutions is unconstitutional. Id. at 17. Government acts that merely confer incidental benefits on religious sects are clearly not unconstitutional if the state has retained a neutral
position towards religion. Id. at 18.
65. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669-70. The Court stated that absolute strict separation is not possible or desirable. Id. at 670. Quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the Court also stated that constitutionally mandated religious "neutrality" permits deviations from the separation

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 4

772

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38: p. 759

Similarly, the Court recognized that the doctrine of strict separation would unnecessarily and improperly strike down all relations
between church and state, regardless of the resultant cost to society. 66 Fortunately, the accommodationist perspective prevailed in
Walz and proceeded to shape the bulk of Establishment Clause
67
litigation that followed.
The Supreme Court analyzed and attempted to clarify its
prior Establishment Clause holdings in the landmark decision of
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 68 Upon reviewing Everson and its progeny, the
Court extracted three criteria for determining the constitutionality of a statute under the Establishment Clause. 69 Collectively,
these criteria created the Lemon tripartite test. 70 First, all governmental statutes must have a secular legislative purpose. 7' Secof church and state. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. As evidence of its reliance on accommodation, the Court succinctly stated:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these
provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored,
none commanded, and none inhibited. The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is
this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Id.
66. See id. at 670 (stating absolute strict separation is not possible or
desirable).
67. For a discussion of the Establishment Clause litigation that followed
Walz, see infra notes 68-117 and accompanying text.
68. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
69. Id. at 612. The Court recognized its previous confusion and difficulty in
interpreting the Establishment Clause. See id. Thus, as in Wa/z, the Court extracted its tripartite test from its interpretation of what the Establishment Clause
was created to combat-"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
of the sovereign in religious activity." Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
70. Id. at 612. As Mr. ChiefJustice Burger noted, however, tests similar to
the Lemon analysis are not strict black letter tests for determining constitutionality because:
[t]here are always risks in treating criteria discussed by the Court from
time to time as "tests" in any limiting sense of that term. Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to the absolutes of the physical
sciences or mathematics. The standards should rather be viewed as
guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of
the Religion Clauses have been impaired.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
71. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. For a discussion of a Supreme Court decision
based on Lemon's secular purpose prong, see infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of the secular purpose requirement, see supra notes 33, 39- 41, 48 and accompanying text. See also Epperson v.
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ond, the principal or primary effect of those statutes must neither
advance nor inhibit religion. 72 Finally, the statutes must not ex73
cessively entangle the affairs of church and state.
Lemon involved a Pennsylvania statute and a Rhode Island
statute authorizing the respective states to supplement non-public school expenditures with public funds.7" Establishment
Clause concerns arose, however, when a study revealed that
ninety-six percent of the non-public school students who benefitted from the statutes attended parochial schools. 7 5 Under the
Lemon tripartite test, both statutes violated the Establishment
Clause because they created an excessive entanglement of church
and state. 76 Ironically, the states only became excessively entangled in religious affairs because, in their attempts to satisfy the
secular purpose and primary effect requirements, they had to enArkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (holding Arkansas statute unconstitutional
because it prohibited public schools from teaching theory of evolution).
72. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. For a discussion of Supreme Court holdings
based on the Lemon primary effect prong, see infra notes 85-87, 101-02 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of the primary effect test
prior to Lemon, see supra notes 33, 39-41 and accompanying text.
73. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The Lemon Court provided a broad framework
for determining when church and state entanglement is actually excessive:
"[W]e must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." Id. at 615. For a
discussion of Supreme Court precedent based on the Lemon excessive entanglement prong, see infra notes 76-77, 103-05 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of the excessive entanglement prong, see supra notes
56-63 and accompanying text.
74. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-10. Both statutes authorized reimbursement for
teacher's salaries, textbooks and various instruction materials. Id.
75. Id. at 614.
76. Id. at 610. The Lemon Court never reached all three prongs of its own
test. Id. at 613-14. The Court admitted that both statutes passed the first test
because their purpose was clearly "to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools." Id. at 613. The Court, however, never addressed the second prong-the primary effect test-because it found an excessive entanglement
under the third prong. Id. at 613-14. The Court stated that "the cumulative
impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves
excessive entanglement between government and religion." Id. at 614. The
Court was mainly concerned with the supplemental salaries provided for teachers. Id. at 616, 620-21. The Court emphasized that "[w]e cannot ignore the
danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-college education."
Id. at 617. The statutes violated the Establishment Clause because the very state
"restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly
nonideological role give rise to entanglements between church and state." Id. at
620-21; cf. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (permitting states
to provide textbooks, lunches and transportation to parochial schools because
state could control and insure secular content). For a detailed discussion of
Lemon's tripartite test, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
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gage in constant surveillance of religious activities. 7 7
Although the Court invalidated the statutes at issue in Lemon,
it nevertheless advocated the decidedly accommodationist perspective it had taken in the past by stating: "Our prior holdings
do not call for total separation . . ,,78 Thus, Thomas Jefferson's
impenetrable "wall" of separation has been reduced to a permeable membrane that tolerates necessary interaction and contact between church and state. 79 Skeptics of "accommodation" should
remember that this doctrinal perspective exists to protect the secular interests of society, not the sectarian interests of religion.
Society accommodates religion to insure that the general public
does not lose the secular benefit of laws merely because such laws
transgress the boundary between church and state.8 0
B.

Post-Lemon Dilemmas

After the Supreme Court carefully crafted the Lemon tripartite
test, the confusion did not dissipate-it continued. 8 ' The Lemon
77. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. The state could not satisfy the first two Lemon
criteria without failing the third because to ensure secular purpose and primary
effect, the state had to excessively entangle itself with the church. Id. The statutes violated the Establishment Clause because they would require constant,
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance." Id. The
Supreme Court has noted the paradox created by the Lemon excessive entanglement prong. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988) (stating "the very
supervision [required] to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute invalid"); see also Patricia M. Lines, The Entanglement Prong of the Establishment
Clause and the Needy Child in the Private School. Is DistributiveJustice Possible?, 17 J.L.
& EDUC. 1, 7 (1988) (noting Lemon primary effect prong often leads to entanglement dilemmas). These problems have led some commentators to question the
true force behind Lemon's entanglement prong:
There is no apparent reason why "entanglement" by itself should invalidate a statute or policy where there has been no showing of adverse
effects on the religious freedom of any individual or group. What
makes entanglement a factor at all is not its existence per se but its tendency to exacerbate a government program's effects on religious liberty.
It is not surprising, then, that the entanglement test has almost always
been used in conjunction with perceived shortcomings in one or both
of the other Lemon prongs.
Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 347-48
(1986).
78. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. In addition to being unnecessary, the Court
also stated that strict separation is not possible and that interaction between
church and state is inevitable. Id.
79. See id.
80. For further discussion of the secular benefits and goals promoted by
accommodating religion, see infra notes 209-217 and accompanying text.
81. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983) ("It is not at all easy ...
to apply this Court's various decisions construing the [Establishment] Clause to
governmental programs [providing] financial assistance to sectarian schools and
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Court had merely outlined what prior Courts had implicitly and
explicitly debated for decades. 8 2 The only real change in Establishment Clause litigation was the increase in precedent that supported both sides of the separation debate. 83 Not surprisingly,
the uncertainty surrounding the Establishment Clause remained
84
and continues to remain fully intact.
Committeefor Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist was
one of the first cases to apply the Lemon tripartite test verbatim. 85
The Nyquist Court applied the Lemon criteria to three distinct
forms of financial support that New York provided to its nonpublic schools: a "maintenance and repair" provision, a tuition reim86
bursement provision, and a beneficial income tax provision.
The Court found that each of these provisions violated the Establishment Clause because their primary effects were, inevitably, to
subsidize and advance sectarian interests. 8 7 Moreover, the Court
the parents of children attending those schools."). For a discussion of the
Court's post-Lemon decisions, see infra notes 86-117 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of pre-Lemon Court holdings that utilized the tripartite
test in varying forms, see supra notes 25-67 and accompanying text.
83. See Franklin, Comment, supra note 7, at 3. "When everything matters,
when nothing is dispositive, when we must juggle incommensurable factors, a
judge can do little but announce his gestalt. Hence, a judge or justice can buttress his [or her] opinion with precedent which most clearly reflects his or her
beliefs." Id. (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947) (holding statute constitutional even though it provided state reimbursement for transportation costs of parochial school students); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
248 (1968) (holding statute constitutional despite its authorization of textbook
loans to parochial schools). But see, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480-82 (1973). (holding statute unconstitutional
because it excessively entangled church and state by reimbursing nonpublic
schools for costs of state mandated, potentially religious functions); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971) (holding statute unconstitutional because it entangled church and state by providing reimbursement for nonpublic
school expenditures such as salaries and textbooks).
84. For a discussion of post-Lemon decisions, see infra notes 85-117 and accompanying text.
85. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
773 (1973).
86. Id. at 774-94.
87. Id. at 779-80, 783-85, 793. The Court distinguished ,Vquist from three
instances of adverse precedent that involved similar funding provisions for parochial schools. Id. First, the Court distinguished Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968), on the grounds that it only allowed the state to loan secular
textbooks directly to students. Id. at 751. Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), was distinguished on the grounds that transportation costs were
"so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function." Allen,
392 U.S. at 782 (citations omitted). For a detailed discussion of Everson, see
supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court distinguished Walz
v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), on the grounds that the tax exemption
at issue did not purport to subsidize parochial schools, but rather was a "fiscal
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rejected the financial aid programs in an effort to calm the existing political tensions over public funding of religious
88
institutions.
As in Lemon, the Court in Nyquist manifested its dedication to
accommodation even though it rejected New York's financial aid
programs.8 9 The Court was, in fact, completely satisfied with the
secular legislative purpose behind the programs-"preserving a
healthy and safe educational environment for all ... schoolchildren." 90 Absent any other complications, the Nyquist Court was
willing to uphold the constitutionality of the financial aid programs even though they conferred a substantial benefit on parochial schools. 9 1 Ultimately, however, even the doctrine of
accommodation was insufficient to overcome the sectarian and
unconstitutional effect of the programs. 9 2 Thus, judicial reliance
on accommodation will not resurrect a law that fails any one or all
of the Lemon criteria; it is simply a more tolerant method of apply93
ing the enumerated criteria.
relationship designed to minimize involvement and entanglement between
Church and State." Id. at 793. For a detailed discussion of Walz, see supra notes
56-66 and accompanying text.
88. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794-95. The Court noted the potential effect of
political divisiveness as an additional consideration not contemplated by the
Lemon test by stating: "assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid
to religion." Id. at 794. Although the Lemon test did not address this concern,
the Lemon Court did: "The potential for political divisiveness related to religious
belief and practice is aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need for
continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623
(1971); see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan,J., concurring) ("[H]istory cautions
that political fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against.").
89. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760-61, 771. The Court stated that "[i]t has never
been thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation." Id. at 760. For a discussion of the analogous facts and holding in Lemon,
see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
90. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 (recognizing valid secular purposes behind New
York's financial aid programs).
91. Id. at 773. Nyquist is distinguishable from Engel v. Vitale and School District v. Schempp in one important respect-secular purpose. The Court never recognized the accommodationist viewpoint in Engel or Schempp because both cases
lacked a valid secular purpose. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963). The Establishment
Clause analysis ceases whenever the Court finds a primarily sectarian purpose
because, despite the accommodationist perspective, a law is unconstitutional if it
fails even one of the Lemon criterion. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. For a
detailed discussion of Engel and Schempp, see supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
92. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 779-80 (concluding that effect of financial aid programs was to subsidize and further "the religious mission of sectarian schools").
93. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 779-80; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620-21.
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The post-Lemon decisions reflect the Court's continued struggle to maintain a consistent degree of separation between church
and state. 9 4 The Court realized that this struggle for consistency
was constrained by the practical impossibility of maintaining an
absolute wall of separation. 95 Notwithstanding this constraint,
however, the Lemon test has become a treble hook from which
96
most courts hang their Establishment Clause holdings.
The Court has decided a multitude of cases in which a government enactment was held to violate the Establishment Clause
because it violated one or all of the Lemon criteria. In Wallace v.
Jaffree, the Court attached its holding to the first prong of the
Lemon test. 9 7 The Wallace Court held an Alabama statute unconstitutional because it clearly lacked a secular purpose. 98 Similarly,
94. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (recognizing Court's commitment to maintaining wall between church and state);John E. McKeever, "Forbidden Fruit": Governmental Aid to Nonpublic Education and the Primary Effect Test
Under the Establishment Clause, 34 VILL. L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1989) ("Since the
Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman the confusion has intensified.") (citations omitted); cf, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760 ("It has never been thought either possible
or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation ....").
95. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) ("In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension between the
objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state
upon the other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible."). Because the Court realized the impossibility
of maintaining an absolute wall between church and state, it wisely chose to "accommodate" a certain amount of interplay between the two. See Felsen, Comment, supra note 63, at 405-10 (discussing doctrinal viewpoint of
"accommodation"). For Thomas Jefferson's famous quote concerning the "wall
of separation" between church and state, see JEFFERSON, supra note 24.
96. The metaphorical "treble hook" represents the three pronged Lemon
test that is used to determine whether government enactments violate the Establishment Clause. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. There appear, however, to be three
Supreme Court cases that declined to apply the Lemon test. See Lee v. Weisman,
112 S.Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) (applying coercion analysis to hold religious invocation and benediction at public high school graduation ceremony unconstitutional); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-95 (1983) (holding constitutional
Nebraska tradition of beginning each session of Congress with prayer by state
funded chaplain); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (stating Lemon
criteria were not appropriate to resolve case at hand because those criteria are
not intended to apply to provisions "that discriminate among religions;" but stating, if Lemon had been used, Minnesota statute requiring state review of sources
making religious contributions would excessively entangle church and state).
97. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985). Wallace involved an Alabama statute that authorized public schools to engage in one minute of meditation each day. Id. at 40. The legislative record indicated that the statute was
designed to have students return to voluntary prayer. Id. at 56-57. There was
no evidence of any secular purpose. Id. at 57.
98. Id. at 56. In Wallace, the sectarian purpose of the statute was uncontested because Alabama Senator Donald Holmes freely admitted that the legislation was an attempt to promote voluntary prayer. Id. at 56-57. Few cases will be
as patently dispositive as Wallace was on Lemon's secular purpose prong. See
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a Louisiana statute requiring public schools to teach the theory of
creation was held unconstitutional in Edwards v. Aguillard.99 As in
Wallace, the Louisiana statute violated the Establishment Clause
because it lacked a secular purpose. 0 0 Based on the second
prong of the Lemon test, the Court found two Michigan sponsored
education programs unconstitutional in GrandRapids School District
v. Ball.'0 ' Michigan's programs violated the Establishment
Clause because their primary effects promoted sectarian interests.10 2 The Court completed a Lemon trilogy by finding an exces03
sive entanglement between church and state in Aguilar v. Felton.'
In Aguilar, New York employed a pervasive monitoring scheme to
ensure that its funding of instruction to low-income children in
private schools was not used to advance primarily religious ideolStone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (stating Kentucky statute requiring Ten
Commandments to be posted had no secular purpose); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (debating whether public school bible readings have
any conceivable secular purpose). In cases where the law at issue lacks a secular
purpose, the doctrine of accommodation is meaningless because no secular benefit could result from accommodating such a law. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 22324; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962). For a discussion of Schempp
and Engel, see supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
99. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587-94 (1987).
100. Id. at 594 (holding primary purpose of Creationism Act was "to endorse a particular religious doctrine" and thus violated Lemon's secular purpose
requirement).
101. School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985). In 1976, a school
district in Grand Rapids, Michigan promulgated two supplemental education
programs: Community Education, and Shared Time. Id. at 375. The programs
provided supplemental education for nonpublic school students at the State's
expense. Id. at 375-79.
102. Id. at 397. The Court held the statutes unconstitutional because the
primary effect of both programs advanced or had the potential to advance religion in three ways:
The state-paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly
indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense. The symbolic union of church and state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the religious school
buildings threatens to convey a message of state support for religion to
students and to the general public. Finally, the programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a
substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects.
Id.
103. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Aguilar was handed down on
the same day as Grand Rapids School District v. Ball. See Ball, 473 U.S. at 373. In
Aguilar, New York City-under a state regulation-provided instructional services to low-income children attending private schools. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 40406. The public programs in Aguilar are virtually identical to those discussed in
Ball. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404-07; Ball, 473 U.S. at 375-79. The City of New
York, however, argued that, unlike Ball, their publicly funded programs were
monitored to insure no religious content. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409.
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ogy. 10 4 In trying to ensure that the funding resulted in a secular
benefit, however, New York became impermissibly entangled in
the affairs of religion. 0 5 Thus, the doctrine of accommodation
will not rescue all laws that compel interaction with religious

institutions.

106

Notwithstanding Lemon, Wallace, Aguillard, Ball and Aguilar,
the Lemon criteria do not condemn all laws that impact religionbeneficially or detrimentally-because the Court has consistently
applied these criteria with a preference towards accommodation. 10 7 In Lynch v. Donnelly, a publicly funded creche did not violate the Establishment Clause even though a creche is a
traditional, distinctly religious object. 108 In Mueller v. Allen, a Minnesota statute did not violate the Establishment Clause even
though it provided tax deductions for expenses incurred in sending one's children to parochial schools.' 0 9 Similarly, in Bowen v.
104. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13 (stating aid was provided to teachers in
sectarian environment and thus demanded ongoing inspection). The holding in
Aguilar is consistent with the holding in Lemon because each regulation would
have required pervasive state monitoring in violation of the excessive entanglement analysis. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (emphasizing
teacher's "potential for impermissible fostering of religion").
105. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413 ("This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement.").
106. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that rejected the constitutionality of laws that resulted in church-state interaction, see supra notes 43-55,
74-77, 97-106 and accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of the Court's adherence to "accommodation"
throughout the development of the Establishment Clause, see supra notes 26106 and infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
108. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, the Court found
that, in erecting the creche, the City acted pursuant to a secular purpose because
it was celebrating and depicting the origins of a holiday. Id. at 681. Second, in
light of prior precedent, the primary effect of the creche did not advance or
endorse religion. Id. at 682 (relying on other government acts deemed constitutional in Everson (reimbursement of transportation costs of parochial school children), McGowan (upholding traditional Sunday Blue Laws) and Walz (permissible
tax exemption for religious institutions)). For a discussion of Everson, McGowan,
and IValz, see supra notes 25-42, 56-63 and accompanying text. Third, there was
no evidence of entanglement to an excessive degree. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.
The Court provides an interesting list of long standing, frequently overlooked government enactments that acknowledge religious heritage within the
bounds of the Establishment Clause: Thanksgiving, Christmas, a National Day
of Prayer and Congressionally provided chapels in the Capitol, to name a few.
Id. at 675-78; see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (holding
statute permitting absence of students for religious holidays constitutional); cf
Harry Simon, Note, Rebuilding the Wtall Between Church and State: Public Sponsorship
of Religious Displays Under the Federal and California Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
499, 499-514 (1986) (stating Lynch v. Donnelly decision was radical departure
from Establishment Clause precedent).
109. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1983). The statute certainly
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Kendrick, Congress' Adolescent Family Life Act satisfied the Lemon
prongs and was held constitutional even though it provided federal grants directly to religious institutions."l 0
Recently, the Supreme Court had another opportunity to
confront the Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman."' Interestingly, the Weisman Court declined to reconsider the appropriateness of the Lemon analysis." 2 At the same time, however, the
Court expressly avoided application of the Lemon test.'3 In evaluating the constitutionality of a state-sponsored invocation at a
high school graduation, the Court focused on the coercive nature
of such ceremonies." 4 The Court emphasized that graduation
ceremonies are so inherently coercive that they unconstitutionally
induce objecting students to conform to religious invocations." 5
had a secular purpose-defraying education costs. Id. at 395. The primary effect of the statute did not advance sectarian interests because the statute applied
broadly to many areas, was available to all parents (including parents with children in public schools), and did not provide aid directly to parochial schools. Id.
at 396-99. The statute did not excessively entangle church and state because the
state could easily determine which textbooks were secular and, therefore, deductible. Id. at 403.
110. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-18 (1988). Bowen is very similar
to New York State School Boards Ass'n v. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d 1146 (N.Y. 1992).
Both cases place an emphasis on whether the respective statutes have the primary effect of advancing religion. See Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1149-51; Bowen, 487
U.S. at 604-15. Similar to Sobol, the Bowen Court held that the government enactments were constitutional because while primarily conferring welfare benefits
on society in general, they only conferred an incidental benefit on religious organizations. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150 (noting regulation's primary effect promoted secular interests, and Establishment Clause allows certain degree of
interaction between church and state); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 606-09.
111. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Weisman sought to enjoin
Providence, Rhode Island school officials from providing an invocation or benediction by a Rabbi at a public school graduation ceremony. Id. at 2653-54.
112. Id.at 2655.
113. Id.The Court claimed that it did not need to follow the traditional
Lemon analysis:
We can decide the case without reconsidering the general constitutional framework by which public schools' efforts to accommodate religion are measured. Thus, we do not accept the invitation . . . to
reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman . . . . The government

involvement with religious activity in this case is pervasive, to the point
of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a
public school. Conducting this formal religious observance conflicts
with settled rules pertaining to prayer exercises for students, and that
suffices to determine the question before us.
Id.
114. Id. at 2661.
115. Id. The school district exercised a great degree of control over the
public high school graduation ceremony. Id. at 2658. Students who objected to
the invocation but wanted to participate in the ceremony were effectively forced
to participate in the religious invocation. Id. at 2658-59. The Court held that
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Given the influential force of formal graduation exercises, most
students felt compelled to attend the whole ceremony. 1 6 Ultimately, therefore, students were forced to either comply with the
invocation or forfeit their participation entirely." 17
Thus, as is apparent from the preceding discussion, the
Supreme Court has created an abundance of confusing and seemingly inconsistent Establishment Clause precedent." l8 The Sobol
court had the unpleasant task of sorting through this precedent to
reach its end result; a result that is, the author submits, absolutely
consistent with the above precedent. 1 9

III.

NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL BOARDS ASS'N V. SOBOL

In 1977, the New York legislature authorized the State Commissioner of Education to regulate health education courses. 12 0
Pursuant to this grant of authority, Commissioner Sobol promulgated a regulation that mandated AIDS instruction to all elementary and secondary school students. 12 In order to reach as many
placing students in this predicament violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at
2661. Even under the Lemon analysis, the Providence school district would, in all
probability, still have violated the Establishment Clause on excessive entanglement grounds. Id. at 2655. The Court stated that "[i]t is beyond dispute that, at
a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way
which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.' " Id.
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
116. Id. at 2658-60 ("In this atmosphere the state-imposed character of an
invocation and benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to make
the prayer a state-sanctioned religious exercise in which the student was left with
no alternative but to submit.").
117. Id. The Court distinguished Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
In Marsh, a prayer at the opening of each session of the state legislature did not
violate the Establishment Clause because the participants were adults who were
free to enter and leave at any time. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. The atmosphere in
Marsh was not sufficiently coercive to violate the Establishment Clause. Id.; cf.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661 ("[Tlhe conformity required of the student in this
case was too high an exaction to withstand the test of the Establishment
Clause.").
118. See McKeever, supra note 94, at 1079-81 (noting Lemon analysis has not
produced "predictability" but has, unfortunately, produced a "bewildering assortment of multi-opinion cases"). For a discussion of these cases, see supra
notes 24-117 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion of how the Sobol court reached a result analytically
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 174-217 and accompanying text.
120. New York State Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (N.Y.
1992). The Commissioner of Education was empowered to "prescribe in regulations such health education courses .

.

. as .

.

. may [be] deem[ed] necessary

and desirable for the welfare of pupils and the community." Id. (quoting N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 804(4) (McKinney Supp. 1992)).
121. Id. The regulation specified that the AIDS instruction must be ."age
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students as possible, the regulation required school boards to create community-based advisory councils to assist in developing an
AIDS education program in New York's public schools. 22 The
regulation expressly mandated four categories of individuals to
be given council positions.' 23 One of the categories specifically
required "representatives from religious organizations."'' 24 The
New York State School Boards Association (Association) challenged this requirement as unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.' 2 5 Ultimately, the New York Court of Appeals held
26
that the regulation did not violate the First Amendment.
In finding Commissioner Sobol's regulation constitutional,
the court applied the tripartite analysis espoused in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.' 2 7 Despite its challenge, the Association conceded that
the regulation had a valid secular purpose: acquiring broad community input so that the AIDS instruction would appeal to as
provide accurate inforappropriate and consistent with community values ....
mation to pupils concerning the nature of the disease, methods of transmission,
and methods of prevention ... [and] stress abstinence as the most appropriate
and effective premarital protection against AIDS." Id. (quoting 8 NYCRR
135.3[b][2]; [c][2]). Under the regulation, students could exclude themselves
from the school instruction if their parents consented and assured the school
that the student would receive AIDS instruction at home. Id.
122. Id. The advisory council was created to incorporate a broad crosssection of community concerns regarding the AIDS program. Id. The objective
was explained thus: "By requiring a cross-section of community persons and
entities to contribute to the development of the AIDS instruction, without restriction or further specification, the regulations reach out to the broadest possible network of input and viewpoints." Id. at 1151.
123. Id. at 1147. The regulation stated that "[t]he advisory council shall
consist of parents, school board members, appropriate school personnel and
community representatives, including :representatives from religious organizations." Id. (quoting N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 135.3[b][2] & [c][2]).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1147-48.
126. Id. at 1152. The court emphasized that the New York State School
Boards Association's complaint alleged facial unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1147. Thus, the court only determined that the regulation was facially constitutional. Id. at 1152. It did not address the regulation's
constitutionality under an "as applied" argument. Id. at 1147-48.
127. Id. at 1149 (noting judicial dissatisfaction with Lemon test); see also
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test, however, does not
determine outcomes; rather, it acts as a guide to the courts in their evaluation of
cases. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (stating Lemon tests are
only guidelines for determining constitutionality). In Sobol, for example, the dissent applied the same tripartite Lemon test as the majority yet it reached the exact
opposite conclusion. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152 (Titone J., dissenting).
Although the Lemon test may produce uncertain results, the Sobol court emphasized that the Supreme Court has "particularly relied on Lemon in every case
involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our children." Id. at 1149 (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
383 (1985)).
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many students as possible.1 28 Thus, Lemon's first criterion was not
disputed. 2 9 As a result, the main issue in Sobol rested on Lemon's
second criterion: whether the regulation had the primary effect of
advancing religion. 30 The court held that it did not. 13 1 The
court also decided, under the third prong in Lemon, that the regulation did not foster an excessive entanglement between church
and state.' 32 Thus, according to the New York Court of Appeals,
33
the regulation satisfied all of the Lemon criteria.'
A.

The Regulation's Valid Primary Effect

The Sobol court found the New York State Commissioner of
Education's regulation constitutional because its primary effect
34
advanced "rational, legitimate, educational and secular goals."1
Dismissing the Association's main argument that mandatory representation of religious views would "convey[] a message of endorsement of religion," the court held that the regulation did not
create a " 'symbolic link' between Church and State."' 3 5 The
court believed that religious proponents could not reasonably
view the regulation as condemning religion, and that religious opponents could not reasonably view it as promoting or endorsing
religion. 36 The court also believed that the primary effect of the
regulation advanced the general welfare of society, not the wel128. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1149. The purpose of the regulation was to acquire broad and early input from the community so that the AIDS program
could reach as many schoolchildren as possible. Id. at 1147; see Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613-18 (1985) (upholding secular purpose of federal Act
that provided funding to religious institutions rendering counseling services in
area of premarital adolescent sexual relations).
129. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1149. For a discussion of Lemon's first prong, the
secular purpose test, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
130. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1149. Responding to this question, the court
held: "The regulations do not have any of those forbidden effects, despite the
conclusory and speculative assertions in the dissenting opinion." Id. at 1150.
For a discussion of the dissenting opinion's "conclusory and speculative" assertions, see infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
131. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151. For a discussion of the dissenting judge's
response to this issue, see infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Sobol's majority opinion in regards to the secular purpose test, see
infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
132. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151-52 (rejecting Association's argument as "entirely speculative"). For a discussion of how the Sobol court handled Lemon's excessive entanglement prong, see infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
133. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152.
134. Id. at 1150. The court stated that the regulation furthered legitimate
secular goals rather than placing a favored or preferred status upon religion. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1150 (citing School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)).
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fare of specific religious groups.' 3 7 Due to the controversial nature of AIDS, the court decided that religious representation on
the advisory board would increase the overall number of students
3 8
willing to participate in New York's AIDS instruction program.
When a state enacts a regulation that increases AIDS education
and awareness among its citizens, society in general receives a
secular benefit. 139 Thus, due to the advisory nature of the council
and the plenary authority of the Boards of Education, any benefit
the regulation conferred on religious sects was merely incidental
to its primary effect of advancing societal welfare and was there40
fore permissible. 1

The Association also claimed that the regulation was unconstitutional because it specified the inclusion of religious representatives without specifying other community groups.' 4 ' The
Sobol court rejected the claim that this specific designation
137. Id. The Association argued that the regulation endorsed religion because it specifically mandated the inclusion of religious representatives and did
not mention other community groups. Id. The Sobol court rejected the Association's argument that this practice "ma[de] adherence to religion a relevant qualification to representation on the councils." Id. The court emphasized that the
consideration of religious views would lead to an AIDS program that reflected
"greater societal consensus." Id. Therefore, the primary effect of the regulation
was to benefit the general welfare of society. Id.; see, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting statutes benefitting
religion may still be constitutional if their primary effect benefits societal welfare
in general).
138. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150. The court noted that:
In the context of the extremely sensitive, complex, and escalating
threat which society faces from AIDS-unless the broadest audience is
reached as early as possible with the most accurate education program
possible-it is particularly sensible for government to add the views of
religious representatives on an advisory level to the predominant views
it will receive from the rest of the community. Indeed, by including and
considering the views of members of the community who are affiliated
with religious organizations, the Commissioner insures that the AIDS
instruction that is eventually adopted will more likely enjoy greater societal consensus and, therefore, greater secular effectiveness. By thus
neutralizing or reducing possible objections from parents and subsequent opt-outs by schoolchildren, a more universal education program
is likely to result.
Id. (citations omitted).
139. See id.
140. Id. (stating council's purely advisory role confirms incidental nature of
effects); see Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 ("A statute that ostensibly promotes a
secular interest often has an incidental or even a primary effect of helping or
hindering a sectarian belief."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)
("[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against stateestablished churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without
regard to their religious beliefs.").
141. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151.
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amounted to an endorsement of religion. 14 2 Similarly, the court
rejected the Association's claim that the regulation improperly
provided religious representatives with automatic access to government decision-making.1 4 3 The court explained that the inclusion of religious representatives on the council did not vest them
with more power than other community representatives. 144 The
categories merely insured a diversity of representation; they did
not require a predetermined number of individuals from any
specified group. 145 In short, the court determined that the regulation could not reasonably be perceived as affording a favored or
146
preferred status upon religion.
B.

Sobol's Permissible Degree of Entanglement

Applying the third prong in Lemon, the Association argued
that the regulation fostered an excessive entanglement of church
and state. 14 7 The court noted several factors that must be considered in determining whether a regulation results in excessive entanglement: the character of the benefitted institution, the
purpose of that institution, the nature of the aid provided, and
48
the resulting relationship between the institution and the state. 1
Traditionally, however, the Supreme Court has utilized Lemon's
excessive entanglement prong primarily to invalidate regulations
that provided financial aid to parochial schools. 149 These funding
142. Id. at 1150-51.
143. Id. (rejecting dissent's view that regulation gives religious representatives "favored status"). For a discussion of Judge Titone's dissenting opinion
asserting that the regulation provided "automatic access" to government decision-making, see infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
144. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151.
145. Id.
146. Id. ("By requiring a cross-section of community persons and entities
to contribute to the development of the AIDS instruction, without restriction or
further specification, the regulations reach out to the broadest possible network
of input and viewpoints.").
147. Id.; see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (recognizing excessive entanglement test as necessarily one of degree).
148. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151 (relying on Lemon v. Kurtzman discussion of
excessive entanglement). A court considers all of these factors when it approaches an Establishment Clause issue from an "accommodationist" point of
view. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Judicial caveats
against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being
a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."). For a discussion of Sobols adherence to
the doctrine of accommodation, see infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
149. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151; see Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410
(1985) ("[W]e observed that though a comprehensive system of supervision
might conceivably prevent teachers from having the primary effect of advancing
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regulations resulted in an impermissible degree of state intervention because the government had to monitor the parochial institutions closely to insure the secular use and effect of public
funds.150 Given this historically narrow and limited use of the excessive entanglement prong, the Sobol court upheld the Commissioner's regulation because it did not entangle church and state to
an impermissible degree.' 5' The Sobol court opined that implementing the regulation at issue in Sobol would not warrant such
52
extensive and intrusive monitoring.
Finally, the Association also asserted that church and state
would become excessively entangled when the state sifted
through council recommendations to screen out those that advanced religion.' 5 3 The court rejected this argument as purely
speculative because there was no guarantee that council recommendations would reflect any religious views.' 54 The court also
rejected, as purely speculative, the Association's alternative argument that the regulation would create political divisiveness when
the Commissioner chose a few select representatives from the
myriad of existing religions.' 5 5 Ultimately, the court rejected
religion, such a system would inevitably lead to an unconstitutional administrative entanglement between church and state."); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618 (holding
state statute providing aid to parochial schools unconstitutional because "a
dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith
and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in
remaining religiously neutral"); cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 (1988)
(holding federal funding program constitutional because amount of monitoring
by Secretary did not excessively entangle church and state).
150. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152. For a discussion of the financial aid cases,
Lemon v. Kurtzman and Aguilar v. Felton, and the "pervasively sectarian" nature of
parochial schools, see supra notes 70-78, 103-05 and accompanying text.
151. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. ("The recommendations that may emerge from advisory councilsnot necessarily from the individuals who constitute the councils-may not include religious viewpoints as such or at all."). The Sobol court concluded that
the dissent's assertions were purely speculative for two reasons: (1) the regulation did not require a specified number of religious representatives nor assign
any preferential weight to their views, and (2) the advisory council's recommendations would not necessarily reflect sectarian interests. Id. at 1151-52; see
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988) (noting Supreme Court has never
invalidated statutes under Establishment Clause merely because of speculated
effects or entanglements).
155. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152 (stating Association's argument had an " 'as
applied' analytical flavor and [had] no merit or record support"). The court did
not agree that the school boards would become excessively entangled in religious affairs when compelled to make a choice among various religious representatives. Id.; see Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794
(1973) ("[Alpart from any specific entanglement of the State in particular reli-
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every argument advanced by the Association and upheld the reg56
ulation's facial constitutionality.
C.

A DissentingAnalysis

The dissenting opinion in Sobol agreed with the majority regarding the general constitutionality of a community-based advisory council.' 5 7 The dissent also recognized the Lemon tripartite
test as the proper framework for evaluating the regulation's constitutionality. 58 The dissent concluded, however, that when the
regulation mandated the inclusion of representatives from religious organizations, it violated Lemon's primary effect test. 159 Applying the same tripartite test as the majority, the dissent reached
an entirely inconsistent conclusion. 60 In this respect, Sobol epitomizes the confusion that has surrounded the Establishment
6
Clause since the Court decided Everson v. Board of Education.' '
gious programs, assistance of the sort here involved carries grave potential for
entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over aid to religion."). For a more in-depth discussion of Nyquist, see supra notes 85-91 and
accompanying text.
156. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152 (concluding regulation satisfied each of
Lemon's three prongs for determining constitutionality).
157. Id. at 1152 (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent concurred with the
majority on the general purpose of the Establishment Clause: "the Clause proscribes not only discrimination against some denominations but also discrimination in favor of religion in general." Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting) ("[T]he tripartite Lemon test is the controlling standard for measuring the constitutional validity of the regulations challenged here.").
159. Id. at 1152 (Titone, J., dissenting) ("In our view, this requirement has
the inevitable and primary effect of both favoring and endorsing religion and, as
such, violates a 'core purpose of the Establishment Clause.' ") (quoting School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985)).
160. Id. at 1153 (Titone,J., dissenting) ("[T]he challenged regulations cannot be regarded as anything other than a patent violation of the Establishment
Clause."). The dissent criticized the majority's interpretation of the Lemon analysis as incomplete. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that Lemon
"and its progeny require a showing of both a legitimate secular purpose and a
Iprimary effect' that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent's point is supported by the Court's holding in School District v. Schempp. See Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) ("[T]o withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.").
161. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Courts have been applying similar tests and reaching opposite conclusions since the beginning of
modern Establishment Clause litigation. See, e.g.,
Everson, 330 U.S. at 29-63
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Rutledge were Justice Frankfurter, Justice Jackson and Justice Burton, all of whom steadfastly disagreed with
how 5-4 majority defined "an establishment of religion"). See also Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798, 805 (1973) (Burger, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting financial aid programs for nonpublic schools
are constitutional because they further secular purposes).
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Conceding that the regulation had a valid secular purpose,
the dissent asserted that the regulation had the improper primary
effect of advancing religious interests. 6 2 According to the dissent, Sobol represents an overly limited view of the challenged
regulation's true practical effects. 16 3 The dissent argued that the
potential interjection of religious principles into a secular curriculum was only one minor aspect of the regulation's impermissible
effect. 16 4 More significantly, the dissent feared the regulation
sent a harmful message suggesting that "the views of religious
[representatives] enjoy a favored status and that relevant secular
viewpoints . . .are of substantially less significance."'16 5 In addition, by guaranteeing religious representatives a position on the
council, the dissent felt that the regulation afforded religious adherents easy access to government decision-making.' 66 The dissenting judges were concerned that such access would exclude
religious nonadherents and result in "political constituencies"
67
along religious lines.1
The dissent also disapproved of the court's emphasis on the
mere "advisory role" of the council.' 68 Accepting that the solicitation of religious views may further a valid secular purpose, the
162. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1153 (TitoneJ., dissenting) (suggesting majority
erred in finding valid secular effect premised simply on secular purpose).
163. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1153-54 (TitoneJ., dissenting) (stating regulation created symbolic union between church and state and therefore endorsed religion). The
dissent also asserted that the regulation excluded other relevant secular viewpoints such as those of psychologists, social workers and business leaders. Id. at
1153 (TitoneJ., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1154 (TitoneJ., dissenting) (noting benefits inherent in providing access to government decision-making are not conferred on other community groups).
167. Id. (Titone,J., dissenting) (relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688 (O'Connor, J.,concurring)). But cf Vincent A. Crockenberg, An Argument for
the Constitutionality of Direct Aid to Religious Schools, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2, 12-14
(1984) (rejecting political divisiveness argument as "historically and empirically
doubtful").
168. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1154 (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent argued
that:
While it is true, as the majority notes, that the Establishment Clause
does not "preclude government from ... taking religion into account,"
it certainly does not follow that government may give religion preferential access to its decision-makers' ears. Nor does itfollow that the Establishment Clausepermits government to confer such favored status on religion over other
viewpoints whenever some secular goal, such as that identified by the majority is
advanced.
Id. at 1154-55 (Titone,J., dissenting) (quoting Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78
(1985) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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dissent reasoned that-in effect-the regulation would incorporate
the views of the religious community, thereby endorsing religion
in general. 169 The dissent concluded that the regulation violated
the Establishment Clause because it improperly advanced reli70
gious interests. 1
Finally, the dissent objected to the harmful message that the
regulation would send to religious nonadherents. 71 As Justice
O'Connor warned in Lynch v. Donnelly: "Endorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, [and] not full
members of the political community . *..."172 The dissent felt
that such a message is inexcusably insensitive to religious
nonadherents and only serves to exacerbate current political tensions.' 73 Thus, other than Lemon's secular purpose requirement,
the dissent and majority disagreed on every facet of this case.
IV.

SOBOL's APPROPRIATE RETURN TO "ACCOMMODATION":

A

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Sobol decision was a commendable and admirable attempt to apply the confusing Supreme Court precedent that surrounds the Establishment Clause.' 74 Since the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Everson v. Board of Education, commentators,
judges and justices have continued to dispute the true intentions
of our Founding Fathers, and have continually failed to reach a
169. Id. at 1155 (Titone, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1156 (Titone, J., dissenting). The dissent also challenged the
validity of the majority's underlying assumption. Id. (TitoneJ., dissenting). The
majority assumed that religious representatives would only increase the AIDS
program's appeal to the public and thus further an overall consensus. Id.
(Titone, J., dissenting). It did not consider the possibility that the existence of
religious representatives on the advisory council would deter non-religious adherents from participating in the program. Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
Finally, the dissent argued that the regulation would cause "the principle of
denominational neutrality ...[to] be violated." Id. at 1156 (Titone, J., dissenting). In filling the mandatory advisory council positions, some religions will necessarily be afforded favored status. Id. (TitoneJ., dissenting). See generally Ira C.
Lupu, Reconstructingthe Establishment Clause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 586-87 (1991) (criticizing "accommodation" of religion because it leads to unequal treatment between religions).
171. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1155-56 (Titone, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1155 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
For a discussion of Lynch, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
173. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1.155 (Titone, J., dissenting).
174. New York Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d 1146 (N.Y. 1992); see,
e.g., Kurland, supra note 58, at 20 ("[T]he three-prong [Lemon] test hardly elucidates the Court's judgments. Nor does it cover the plastic nature of the judgments in this area. Judicial discretion, rather than constitutional mandate,
controls the results.").
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unanimous consensus as to the appropriateness of the Lemon analysis.175 Despite this confusion, however, the Sobol court has
reached a decision that is indeed supported by Supreme Court
76
precedent.
In reaching its decision, the Sobol court correctly approached
the Establishment Clause issue from an "accommodationist" perspective. 17 7 The court recognized that it could not maintain an
175. See generally Robert L. Cord, Interpreting the Establishment Clause of the
FirstAmendment: A "Non-Absolute Separationist"Approach,4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 731, 742 (1990) (expressing his discontent and discontent of
many Supreme Court Justices with Lemon test); Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test:
Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or Reected?, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 513 (1990); Lines, supra note 77, at 1 ("[T]he [Lemon] test itself fails to
serve the primary function of such tests, predictability in future cases.").
176. See Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1148-52. The Sobol conclusion is not necessarily correct; it is, however, supported by Supreme Court precedent. Id. The
Supreme Court has consistently chosen to apply the Lemon analysis. See, e.g.,
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988); see also Claudia R. Carrington,
Note, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock: An Argument for Strict Interpretation of the
Lemon Test, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 605, 613 (1991) (noting Court's continued use of
Lemon test as first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman). The only Supreme Court
cases that have not expressly applied the Lemon test are Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.
Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); and Larkin v.
Grendel's Den Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). For a discussion of how and why the
Supreme Court and lower courts have occasionally avoided the Lemon test, see
Felsen, Comment, supra note 63, at 413-18 (noting lower courts' struggle with
Lemon tests because tests lack specific doctrinal viewpoint). For a more in-depth
discussion concerning the appropriateness of Lemon, see Roald Y. Mykkeltvedt,
Lemon or Marsh? An Establishment Clause Conundrum, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1131
(1990). Thus, given the Court's historical reliance on Lemon, the Sobol court was
wise to follow the traditional tripartite analysis. For a discussion of the three
pronged test articulated in Lemon, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
Many commentators feel that the Lemon test is insufficient and incomplete.
See Cord, supra note 175, at 743. Professor Cord believes that three different
questions would eliminate much of the confusion surrounding Lemon's three
prongs:
First, is the governmental action within the constitutional power of the
acting public body? Second, is the governmental action religiously
nonpartisan in that it does not elevate any religion, religious sect or
religious tradition into a preferred legal status? Third, is there a reasonable or rational ends-means relationship?
Id. In adhering to Lemon, however, the Sobol court subjected itself to an abundance of inconsistent and contradictory Establishment Clause precedent. See
McKeever, supra note 94, at 1079 ("The decisions of the United States Supreme
Court concerning the establishment clause of the first amendment... are inconsistent and contradictory ....");see also Franklin, Comment, supra note 7, at 3
("The legacy of the Lemon test, though, has been an unclear and unpredictable
application by the [Supreme] Court."); Gey, Note, supra note 24, at 1473 ("Recent establishment clause decisions have given little practical guidance to legislatures and lower courts and have not provided a basic set of consistent, sound
philosophical principles with which to justify legal relationships between church
and state.").
177. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1148; see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
673 (1984) ("[Tlhe Constitution [does not] require complete separation of
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absolute wall of separation between church and state, and accepted a degree of inevitable interplay between the two. 17 8 The
dissenting judges were unwilling to succumb to this doctrinal
viewpoint and implicitly advocated a position of strict separation. 179 Thus, the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent can be reduced to one general, conflicting theme-accommodation versus strict separation. 80 Arguably, both opinions are
correct within the bounds of their respective doctrinal perspecchurch and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."); see also Felsen, Comment, supra note 63, at 398, 405-10. Felsen discusses three doctrinal viewpoints
that the courts have used in trying to maintain a position of governmental neutrality. Felsen, Comment, supra note 63, at 399. The three viewpoints are: strict
separation, accommodation, and pluralism. Id. at 398. The Supreme Court has
implicitly taken an accommodationist perspective since Everson v. Board of Education. See Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947) (holding parental reimbursement for
children's transportation costs to parochial schools constitutional because, even
though religion received benefit, primary effect of statute was to benefit all New
Jersey citizens); see also James E. Wood, Jr., Separation Vis-a-vis Accommodation: A
New Direction in American Church-State Relations?, 31 J. CHURCH & ST. 197, 197-206
(1989).
178. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1148. The Sobol court stated that "the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that total separation between government
and any governmental acknowledgment of the role of religion in citizens' lives is
not possible or desirable, and would in fact exhibit hostility rather than a constitutionally correct neutrality towards religion." Id.; see, e.g., Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973) (stating "[i]t has never been thought
either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation"); see also
Pfeffer, supra note 35, at 700 ("Every jurist, lawyer or political scientist recognizes that one hundred per cent strict separation of church and state cannot be
achieved at all times and in all places."). But cf Esbeck, supra note 175, at 546-48
(noting four major problems with doctrinal perspective of "accommodation");
Lupu, supra note 170, at 580-600 (detailing multiple reasons for rejecting "accommodation" perspective). Esbeck did note, however, that: "the Lemon test,
however applied, is bound to contradict the deeply held religious beliefs of
some, while affirming, or at least coinciding with, the religious beliefs of others."
Esbeck, supra note 175, at 543-44. Esbeck's recognition of this fact is consistent
with the Supreme Court's adherence to accommodation. See Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589, 612-13 (1988) (noting valid secular purpose can render government enactment constitutional even if enactment also benefits religion).
179. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1153 (Titone, J., dissenting). Although the dissent did not purport to follow a theory of strict neutrality, it appeared to do so
implicitly in its criticism of the majority approach: "Indeed, the entire tenor of
the majority's opinion suggests that it views the problem presented here solely
as one involving a potential religious interference with school curriculum decisions." Id. (Titone,J., dissenting). Had the dissent adopted an accommodationist perspective, it would have more readily accepted the inevitable interaction
between church and state caused by the regulation. See id. at 1150. For a discussion of the doctrinal viewpoint of "strict separation," see Felsen, Comment,
supra note 63, at 398-405.
180. In simplifying the arguments of the majority and dissent into manageable themes-"accommodation" and "strict separation"-we unfortunately
have come full circle to an entirely unmanageable theme: original intent. For a
discussion of the original intent of the First Amendment's Founding Fathers, see
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tives.' 8 ' The Sobol majority's adherence to accommodation, however, is more consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 8 2
supra note 24. The Supreme Court has, however, exhibited a decidedly accommodationist perspective:
It is clear that neither the 17 draftsmen of the Constitution who were
Members of the First Congress, nor the Congress of 1789, saw any establishment problem in the employment of congressional Chaplains to
offer daily prayers in the Congress, a practice that has continued for
nearly two centuries. It would be difficult to identify a more striking
example of the accommodation of religious belief intended by the
Framers.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (emphasis added); see also John M.
Flynn, Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Accommodation of Religion-theAnswer to the Invocation Dilemma-Jagerv. Douglas County School District, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1045, 1078-81 (1989) (outlining Court's reasoning for adopting "accommodation" as its doctrinal perspective). For a discussion of strict separation and accommodation, see Felsen, Comment, supra note 63, at 400-10.
181. The dissent's holding is entirely consistent with the theory of strict
separation. See Gey, Note, supra note 24, at 1475 (stating strict neutrality "would
forbid not only financial support of religion by the state, but also 'any official
involvement with religion, whatever its form, which tends to foster or discourage
religious worship or belief' "). For an analysis of Establishment Clause precedent from a strict separationist viewpoint, see generally Pfeffer, supra note 35, at
708-29.
182. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150; see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
669-70 (1970). The Walz Court subscribed to this notion of accommodation:
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these
provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored,
none commanded, and none inhibited.
No perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existN..
ence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks
to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.
Id.; see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-74 (noting impossibility of maintaining total
separation between church and state); West, supra note 34, at 99. West uses the
term "benevolent neutrality" instead of"accommodation." Id. The terms, however, convey the same meaning and interpretation of the Establishment Clause:
[Viarious government laws or actions inevitably either help or hurt religion or some particular religious activity or group. Complete neutrality
is thus impossible. Rather than dispense entirely with the principle of
neutrality as a tool of constitutional adjudication, however, the Court
has modified or interpreted it in such a way that it does not preclude
some degree of aid or harm to religion.
Id. (emphasis added). But see Marshall, supra note 24, at 928-29. Marshall stated
that:
The Court has never adopted the separationist stance sought by liberals and their sometimes strange bedfellows, evangelicals. It has not
adopted the accommodationist stance sometimes sought by major religious groups seeking aid or by certain conservatives seeking affirmative
approval of religion. It has not created a wall. It has not maintained a
course of strict neutrality between religions or between religion and
nonreligion. In short, it has kept absolutely nobody happy.
Id.; also cf. Tracy Prewitt, Note, Bowen v. Kendrick: The Constitutionality of the
Adolescent Family Life Act-Has the Court Given Us a Lemon?, 28J. FAM. L. 87, 103
(1990) (discrediting holding in Bowen and implicitly rejecting notion of accom-
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The Primary Effect Test and "Accommodation"

The Sobol court's adherence to "accommodation" was most

evident in its discussion of Lemon's primary effect test.' 8 3 The majority correctly held that the regulation's primary effect did not
advance or inhibit religion, but rather advanced "rational, legitimate, educational and secular goals."'18 4 As evidence of its "accommodationist" perspective, the court properly concluded that
any benefit the regulation conferred on religion was permissible
because such benefit was merely secondary or incidental to its
85
valid primary effect.'
modation "[b]ecause the Court view[ed] the nature of the benefitted institution
as dispositive"). However, the Bowen Court only relied on the nature of the institution and whether it was "pervasively sectarian" because it recognized that
some degree of interplay between church and state had to be accommodated.
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612-13 (1988). Bowen did not view the nature
of the institution as dispositive, but rather as a reminder for the Court to remain
within the bounds of "accommodation." Id. at 616.
183. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1149 (1992). Although Lemon represented a positive step toward reinforcing the wall of separation between church and state, the
Lemon Court made it clear that it would not advocate complete and permanent
separation. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Judicial caveats
against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being
a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."). The dissenting judges in Sobol conceded
the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1153 (Titone,
J., dissenting). For a discussion of the regulation's secular purpose, see supra
notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
Given the difficulty the Court has had in distinguishing a primary effect
from an incidental effect, the Sobol court's struggle to determine the true primary
effect of the regulation is not surprising. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1149-51, 1153-54;
see McKeever, supra note 94, at 1086. One author states that "[tihe Court has
not developed any principled way of determining how the search for the effects
of a statute should be conducted and where it should end. As a result, the Court
has often relied on extremely attenuated 'effects' in holding that an aid program
is unconstitutional." McKeever, supra note 94, at 1085-86. In addition, the author noted: "[t]he Court's application of the primary effect test could also result
in the very same statute being constitutional in one state but not in another." Id.
at 1089.
184. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150; see School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397
(1985) (holding two state sponsored programs unconstitutional because their
primary effect advanced religion in three ways). For a detailed discussion of the
three prohibited effects outlined in Ball, see supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. Although the "primary effect" test seems to connote a balancing process, it is really just a label used when courts decide to invalidate a regulation
because it significantly affects religion. See McKeever, supra note 94, at 1084-85.
185. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150. Labeling the benefits as "incidental" is
consistent with the Supreme Court's multiple forays into the primary effect test
of Lemon. Id.;see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) ("We would be loath
to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual
reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed
benefits under the law.") (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor has advocated
accommodation as well:
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Many Supreme Court cases expressly comport with Sobol's reliance on the doctrine of "accommodation." 18 6 Bowen v. Kendrick,
for example, strongly supports Sobol's "primary effect" holding.' 8 7 Bowen involved a statute that permitted the federal government to distribute grants to religious institutions that
provided counseling services concerning premarital adolescent
sexual relations.' 8 8 The Bowen Court upheld the facial constitutionality of the statute because, even though the statute may have
benefitted religious groups, its primary effect did not advance or
inhibit religion.' 8 9 The regulation's primary effect promoted the
overall welfare of society in general. 190 Sobol's regulation also
promoted the overall welfare of society because its primary effect
and secular aim were to increase AIDS awareness in America's
youth. 191
In this country, church and state must necessarily operate within the
same community. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that the
secular interests of government and the religious interests of various
sects and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and combine. A statute that ostensibly promotes a secular interest often has an
incidental or even a primary effect of helping or hindering a sectarian
belief.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf McKeever, supra note 94, at 1087 ("The terms 'primary,' 'direct,' 'indirect,' and
'incidental' are merely labels which describe a conclusion rather than substantive
tests used to arrive at the conclusion.").
186. For a discussion of Supreme Court cases that adhere to the "accommodationist" perspective, see supra notes 26-110 and accompanying text. For a
more detailed discussion of "accommodation," see supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
187. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 611-15 (1988). Bowen provides Sobol
with strong precedential support because the cases are legally and factually
alike. Id.; Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1146-47; cf. McKeever, supra note 94, at 1086-87
& nn.23-24 (noting difficulty of supporting primary effect holdings because of
inconsistent precedent). For a discussion of the Bowen case, see supra note 110
and accompanying text.
188. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593-98. The Adolescent Family Life Act provided
grants to religious institutions rendering research and services in the area of
premarital adolescent sexual relations. Id. at 593-94.
189. Id. at 613 ("But the possibility or even the likelihood that some of the
religious institutions who receive AFLA funding will agree with the message that
Congress intended to deliver to adolescents through the AFLA is insufficient to
warrant a finding that the statute on its face has the primary effect of advancing
religion."). The Bowen Court clearly supported an accommodationist perspective: "whatever 'symbolic link' might in Fact be created by the AFLA's disbursement of funds to religious institutions is not sufficient to justify striking down
the statute on its face." See id. at 614.
190. Id. at 613-14 (noting "symbolic link" argument is weak because funding was used solely for secular purposes).
191. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150. The court concluded that placing religious
representatives on the advisory council would promote greater societal consensus regarding AIDS instruction. Id. The trial court and the appellate court also
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Under the auspices of "accommodation," the Sobol court, like
the Bowen Court, rejected all of the dissenting arguments. The
Bowen Court refused to presume that religious grantees could
only perform their function in a sectarian manner or with a sectarian purpose.' 9 2 The Sobol court properly negated a similar presumption-that the council could not function without promoting
religious interest-and struck down a majority of the dissenting
assertions as purely speculative. 193 The Bowen Court also disregarded, as purely speculative, the plaintiff's concern that religious
grantees would impermissibly use government funds to foster
194
religious beliefs and thus violate Lemon's primary effect test.
Because Bowen chose to accommodate permissible levels of interaction between church and state, it rejected all of the plaintiff's
speculative arguments.1 9 5 The Sobol court correctly followed
Bowen's underlying doctrinal viewpoint-accommodation-and
96
discarded the dissenting opinion's comparable assertions.
In short, the theme that pervaded the Sobol decision was consistent with the theme that pervaded the Bowen decision and its
progeny-a valid secular purpose and effect must prevail over a
tenuous "symbolic link" between church and state. 19 7 The Sobol
reached this conclusion: "the regulations properly reflect that 'representatives
from religious organizations' have some role to contribute in addressing the
AIDS epidemic, and that the challenged portion of the regulation has only an
incidental and remote, not primary, effect on the advancement of religion." Id.
at 1148.
192. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612. According to the Court: "Only in the context
of aid to 'pervasively sectarian' institutions have we invalidated an aid program
on the grounds that there was a 'substantial' risk that aid to these religious institutions would, knowingly or unknowingly, result in religious indoctrination." Id.
Bowen also noted that the Court has never struck down a statute simply "in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitutional use of funds."
Id. (quoting Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976)).
193. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150, 1152. For a discussion of the speculative
nature of the dissenting judge's views on the primary effect of the New York
State Commissioner of Education's regulation, see supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
194. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 613 (stating facially neutral projects are not unconstitutional simply because they are carried out by religious affiliations). The
threat in Lemon was the possibility that parochial school teachers might interject
sectarian views into otherwise secular instruction. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 619 (1971).
195. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612-16 (refusing to hold statute unconstitutional
just because it potentially benefitted religion).
196. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151.
197. Id. at 1150; Bowen, 487 U.S. at 613-14. The Bowen Court noted that a
symbolic link between church and state might be created but that link was insufficient to strike down the enactment:
If we were to adopt [this view], it could be argued that any time a government aid program provides funding to religious organizations in an
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court utilized the "accommodationist" perspective, consistent
with Supreme Court precedent, 19 8 and recognized the regulation's valid primary effect-to increase the number of students receiving AIDS instruction. 199 Thus, given the regulation's obvious
secular objective and its legitimate primary effect, any benefits
conferred on religion were incidental, indirect or secondary and,
20 0
therefore, permissible.
B.

The Excessive Entanglement Test and "Accommodation"

The Sobol court was also correct in holding that the regulation did not excessively entangle church and state.2 0 l The majorarea in which the organization also has an interest, an impermissible
"symbolic link" could be created, no matter whether the aid was to be
used solely for secular purposes. This would jeopardize government
aid to religiously affiliated hospitals, for example, on the ground that
patients would perceive a "symbolic link" between the hospital ... and
whatever government entity is subsidizing the purely secular medical
services provided to the patient.
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 613; cf. Theodore C. Hirt, "Symbolic Union" of Church and State
and the "Endorsement" of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment ClauseJurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823, 837-48 (1989) (concluding "symbolic union" test is unnecessary and confusing).
198. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). In McDaniel, Justice Brennan stated that "the Court's decisions
have indicated that the limits of permissible governmental action with respect to
religion under the Establishment Clause must reflect an appropriate accommodation of our heritage as a religious people .... " Id. at 638 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). For a discussion of accommodation, see supra notes
174-82 and accompanying text.
199. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1149 (noting valid secular purpose of Commissioner of Education's advisory council regulation).
200. Id. The Court accepted the constitutionality of "accommodation"
when it created the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
Since Lemon, the Court has validated many government statutes involving religion. See Felsen, Comment, supra note 63, at 408-09. Utilizing the "accommodationist" approach increased the Court's flexibility in dealing with the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 408. However, increased flexibility necessarily resulted in decreased predictability. Id. at 408-09. For a discussion of the uselessness of distinguishing between indirect, incidental and secondary effect, see
McKeever, supra note 94, at 1087.
201. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151-52; see Esbeck, supra note 175, at 528-531
(discussing Lemon's entanglement prong generally as protecting excessive administrative entanglement between church and state and preventing political division along religious lines). Almost all discussions of Lemon's entanglement
prong evolve around aid to parochial schools. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 413 (1985) (holding aid to parochial schools violated entanglement because of necessary state supervision); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (holding certain
forms of aid to parochial schools unconstitutional because states had to pervasively monitor schools to ensure secular use of funds). Federal and state aid to
colleges has also seen extensive debate on Lemon's entanglement prong. See
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) (holding statute providing aid to colleges did not excessively entangle church and state because col-
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ity noted that most precedent that held statutes violative of
Lemon's entanglement prong had arisen in the context of public
funding to parochial schools. 20 2 In the two major "entanglement" cases, Aguilar v. Felton and Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme
Court held that both government aid programs were unconstitutional because the state monitoring necessary to ensure the secular use of the funds was too pervasive. 20 3 In Sobol, however, the
state monitoring and supervision needed to ensure that the council's recommendations did not foster religious beliefs was far
20 4
from pervasive.
The Sobol court appropriately recognized that the question of
whether a government enactment excessively entangles the affairs
of church and state has always been one of degree.2 0 5 The degree
leges were "capable of separating secular and religious functions"); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973) (holding South Carolina Educational Facilities
Authority Act did not excessively entangle church and state because Baptist-controlled college provided secular education and was not "an instrument of religious indoctrination"); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S 672, 687 (1971) (holding
Higher Education Facilities Act did not excessively entangle church and state
"[because] religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity of
these church-related colleges and universities, [and therefore] there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area
of secular education").
202. See, e.g., Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412-13 (holding statute providing financial
assistance to parochial schools unconstitutional because administrative monitoring improperly entangled church and state); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (holding
statute providing funding for non-public schools unconstitutional because cumulative impact of statutes excessively entangled church and state to impermissible degree).
203. The states could not provide secular aid to parochial schools because
such aid inevitably led to excessive entanglement. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413
("This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition
of excessive entanglement."); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988)
("[Tlhis litigation presents us with yet another 'Catch-22' argument: the very
supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute invalid."). For a detailed discussion of Lemon and the tripartite analysis, see
supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. For a more in-depth analysis of
Aguilar, see supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
204. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1152 ("Obviously, the ongoing monitoring and
supervision required in connection with the administration of financial aid regulations is not implicated here .... "). The Aguilar Court stated that Lemon's entanglement prong served two purposes: (1) to prevent the state from hindering
the views of non-religious adherents even though the act may be largely secular
in purpose, and (2) to prevent the state from intruding on and hindering the
views of religious adherents. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-10. The extent to which a
state has to monitor and supervise its religion-related programs to ensure a secular effect, however, is not always excessive. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616-17 (stating secretarial monitoring did not excessively entangle church and state).
205. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151. As the Supreme Court stated in Il'alz v. Tax
Commission, the excessive entanglement "test is inescapably one of degree."
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of entanglement necessary to monitor Sobol's advisory council was
not excessive because the nature of the council was not as pervasively sectarian as the nature of the parochial schools in Aguilar
and Lemon. 20 6 Accordingly, the Sobol court-relying on the "degree" of entanglement-reaffirmed its commitment to "accommodation" by adopting the excessive entanglement test as first
set forth in Walz v. Tax Commission.20 7 When the Sobol court assessed the regulation's resultant degree of entanglement, it was
accepting implicitly a certain amount of interplay between church
and state.2 0 8 Thus, Sobol's holding reflected an "accommodationist" position with respect to all three of the Lemon criteria.
V.

SOBOL'S CONTRIBUTION TO AN EXISTING PLETHORA OF
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LITIGATION

As discussed previously, the Sobol court remained completely
loyal to the Supreme Court's "accommodationist" perspective.2 0 9
Thus, Sobol stands as a contemporary, willful reaffirmation of the
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (discussing excessive entanglement prong of Establishment Clause analysis).
206. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151-52; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-10; Lemon, 403
U.S. at 614; see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616. In Bowen, the Court refused to assume that the religious grantees were pervasively sectarian. Bowen, 487 U.S. at
616. Because the aid was not going to institutions as pervasively sectarian as
parochial schools, "[t]here [was] no reason to fear that the less intensive monitoring involved here [would] cause the Government to intrude unduly in the
day-to-day operation of the religious affiliate[] .... " Id.; cf. Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 370-71 (1975) ("The likelihood of inadvertent fostering of religion may be less in a remedial arithmetic class than in a medieval history seminar, but a diminished probability of impermissible conduct is not sufficient
....
.).
207. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1151-52; see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 670. When a
court measures constitutionality based on "degree," it is implicitly recognizing
an "accommodationist's" perspective. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674-75 (holding excessive entanglement test is necessarily one of degree). For a detailed discussion of
the Walz decision, see supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. By definition,
one degree of entanglement will be permissible, while another degree will be
excessive. Id. Thus, by extrapolation, the Court will accommodate a certain degree of entanglement but not total entanglement. But see Lupu, supra note 170,
at 586 (noting accommodation can lead to trouble because "as a matter of political dynamics, accommodations will typically breed pressure or more
accommodations").
208. See IWa/z, 397 U.S. at 670, 674-75.
209. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150-52; see, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 614 (1971) ("Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the
line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable
barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."); cf. JEFFERSON, supra note 24. For a detailed discussion of the "accommodation" perspective, see supra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
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799

210
growing judicial preference towards accommodating religion.
The only way government authorities can ensure that their enactments do not advance or inhibit religion is to accommodate a limited degree of interaction between church and state. The Sobol
decision supports this assertion and exemplifies the need for
accommodation.211
Moreover, a statute's secular purpose and effect must prevail
over any tenuous "symbolic link" it creates with religion. 21 2 By
adhering to an "accommodationist" perspective, courts can ensure that statutes with valid secular purposes will indeed prevail. 2 13 These statutes will not be struck down simply because
religious groups benefit in an incidental manner. The Sobol decision shows us that courts should not invalidate statutes simply because they confer a benefit on religion.2 1 4 If a statute's primary
benefit falls on society, what purpose is served by denying this

210. SeeJohn E. Dunsford, The Relevance of Original Intention in Thinking About
Establishment Clause Problems, 6 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 197, 197-202 (1987)
(supporting accommodationist interpretation of Establishment Clause); cf. Pfeffer, supra note 35, at 729 (suggesting strict separation is alive and well based on
Supreme Court decisions in Edwards v. Aguillard, Aguilar v. Felton, and School District v. Ball). The Sobol court refused to apply a strict standard of separation.
Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1147-48 (1992). Professor Lupu, however, feels that an
"accommodationist" perspective creates more problems than it solves:
Those in the position to accommodate will have grave difficulty maintaining objectivity about where lines are to be drawn. Customary practices are likely to be accommodated; unusual ones are less likely to be
so treated. Among the unusual practices, it is improbable that the
more threatening ones will receive a warm reception from the state's
decisionmakers. At most, the state will define its accommodation policy
so as to limit its exposure to unknown or undesirable sects. A regime
of accommodation, designed at least in part to produce substantive
equality between nonreligious and religious interests, is highly likely to
privilege mainstream, well-known religions, or locally dominant ones,
and thereby to aggravate conditions of religious inequality.
Lupu, supra note 170, at 586 (emphasis added).
211. Without an accommodationist perspective, the New York regulation
would not be able to reach the broadest scope of students possible. The author
of this Note submits that if the Sobol court had not chosen to apply an accommodationist viewpoint, it would have diminished the regulation's secular effect.
212. For an explanation of why courts should "accommodate" religion
rather than erect a wall of strict separation, see supra notes 174-205 and accompanying text.
213. See TRIBE, supra note 6, § 14-14 ("Government may sometimes accommodate religion; in some circumstances, it must do so.").
214. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613 (1988). The Bowen
court noted that it would be illogical and counterproductive to invalidate perfectly secular statutes merely because they also benefitted religion. Id. The
Bowen Court stated that:
If we were to adopt [this] reasoning, it could be argued that any time a
government aid program provides funding to religious organizations in
an area in which the organization also has an interest, an impermissible
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benefit to the public merely because religious institutions benefit
as well?

2 15

Finally, the Sobol decision provides us with a vital reminder
that our Founding Fathers adopted the Religion Clauses to protect the common good by ensuring individual rights. 21 6 The
courts can best accomplish this goal by subscribing, as the Sobol
court did, to an "accommodationist" perspective. 21 7
Alan R. Gries
"symbolic link" could be created, no matter whether the aid was to be
used solely for secular purposes.
Id.; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) ("[Tlhe Establishment Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose reason or
effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions.").
215. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) (refusing to hold
statute unconstitutional simply because classes of private individuals incur benefit); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442.
216. For a discussion of the original intent of our Founding Fathers, see
supra note 6. The true intent of our Founding Fathers is a hotly contested issue.
Id. The author of this Note submits, however, that all would agree that the overriding purpose of the Establishment Clause and any other Constitutional clause
is to promote the overall welfare of society as a whole. The doctrine of accommodation best accomplishes this goal.
217. See Sobol, 591 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (1992) (stating total separation between church and state is not desirable or beneficial).
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